| | |  | Consumer Protection | Home » » The Myths of Security: What the Computer Security Industry Doesn't Want You to Know | | | | | | | Description: | | If you think computer security has improved in recent years, The Myths of Security will shake you out of your complacency. Longtime security professional John Viega, formerly Chief Security Architect at McAfee, reports on the sorry state of the industry, and offers concrete suggestions for professionals and individuals confronting the issue.
Why is security so bad? With many more people online than just a few years ago, there are more attackers -- and they're truly motivated. Attacks are sophisticated, subtle, and harder to detect than ever. But, as Viega notes, few people take the time to understand the situation and protect themselves accordingly. This book tells you: - Why it's easier for bad guys to "own" your computer than you think
- Why anti-virus software doesn't work well -- and one simple way to fix it
- Whether Apple OS X is more secure than Windows
- What Windows needs to do better
- How to make strong authentication pervasive
- Why patch management is so bad
- Whether there's anything you can do about identity theft
- Five easy steps for fixing application security, and more
Provocative, insightful, and always controversial, The Myths of Security not only addresses IT professionals who deal with security issues, but also speaks to Mac and PC users who spend time online.
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• ISBN13: 9780596523022
• Condition: New
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| | | Product Details: | | | Author:
| John Viega | | Paperback:
| 264 pages | | Publisher:
| O'Reilly Media | | Publication Date:
| June 26, 2009 | | Language:
| English | | ISBN:
| 0596523025 | | Product Length:
| 8.4 inches | | Product Width:
| 5.4 inches | | Product Height:
| 0.7 inches | | Product Weight:
| 0.7 pounds | | Package Length:
| 8.3 inches | | Package Width:
| 5.5 inches | | Package Height:
| 0.4 inches | | Package Weight:
| 0.6 pounds | | Average Customer Rating:
|  based on 31 reviews |
| | | | Customer Reviews: | |
Average Customer Review:
 ( 31 customer reviews )
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24 of 27 found the following review helpful:
 Since consumers don't care about security, why write a book like this for them?Aug 14, 2009
By Richard Bejtlich
"TaoSecurity"
Let me start by saying I usually like John Viega's books. I rated Building Secure Software 5 stars back in 2005 and 19 Deadly Sins of Software Security 4 stars in 2006. However, I must not be the target audience for this book, and I can't imagine who really would be. The book mainly addresses consumer concerns and largely avoids the enterprise. However, if most consumers think "antivirus" when they think "security," why would they bother reading The Myths of Security (TMOS)?
TMOS is strongest when Viega talks about the antivirus (or antimalware, or endpoint protection, or whatever host-centric security mechanism you choose) industry. I didn't find anything to be particularly "myth-shattering," however. I have to agree with two of the previous reviewers. Many of the "chapters" in this book could be blog posts. The longer chapters could be longer blog posts. The lack of a unifying theme really puts TMOS at a disadvantage compared to well-crafted books. I was not a huge fan of The New School of Information Security or Geekonomics (both 4 stars), but those two titles are better than TMOS.
If you want to read books that will really help you think properly about digital security, the two must-reads are still Secrets and Lies by Bruce Schneier and Security Engineering, 2nd Ed by Ross Anderson. I would avoid Bruce's sequel, Beyond Fear -- it's ok, but he muddles a few concepts. (Heresy, I know!) I haven't read Schneier on Security, but I imagine it is good given the overall quality of his blog postings.
If you want to shatter some serious myths, spend time writing a book on the "80% myth," which is stated in a variety of ways by anyone who is trying to demonstrate that insider threats are the worst problem facing digital security. If you're going to pretend to debunk open source security, why not back it up with some numbers? Studies have been published recently, and original research and results would be welcome. How about demonstrating that user awareness training wastes money, because enough marks fall prey anyway? I'd also like to see research showing that frequent password changes are worse for security, not better. Wrap all of that in a coherent manner with substantial chapters and you have a real TMOS book.
13 of 18 found the following review helpful:
A contrarian provides an interesting look at the information security industryAug 31, 2009
By Ben Rothke
"Author of 'Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know'"
The Myths of Security: What the Computer Security Industry Doesn't Want You to Know is an interesting and thought-provoking book. Ultimately, the state of information security can be summed up in the book's final three sentences, in which John Viega writes that 'real, timely improvement is possible, but it requires people to care a lot more [about security] than they do. I'm not sure that's going to happen anytime soon. But I hope it does.'
The reality is that while security evangelists such as Viega write valuable books such as this, it is for the most part falling on deaf ears. Most people don't understand computer security and its risks, and therefore places themselves and the systems they are working in danger. Malware finds computers to load on, often in part to users who are oblivious to the many threats.
Much of the book is made up of Viega's often contrarian views of the security industry. With so much hype abound, many of the often skeptical views he writes about, show what many may perceive are information security truths, are indeed security myths.
From the title of the book, one might think that there is indeed a conspiracy in the computer security industry to keep users dumb and insecure. But as the author notes in chapter 45 -- An Open Security Industry, the various players in the computer security industry all work in their own fiefdoms. This is especially true when it comes to anti-virus, with each vendor to a degree reinventing the anti-virus wheel. The chapter shows how sharing amongst these companies is heavily needed. With that, the book's title of What the Computer Security Industry Doesn't Want You to Know is clearly meant to be provocative, but not true-life.
The book is made up of 48 chapters, on various so called myths. Most of the chapter are 2-3 pages in length and tackle each of these myths. The range of topics covers the entire security industry, with topics spanning from various security technologies, issues, risks, and people.
While not every chapter is a myth per se, many are. Perhaps the most evocative of the security myth is chapters 10 -- Four Minutes to Infection and chapter 22 -- Do Antivirus Vendors Write their own Viruses?. But the bulk of the book is not about myths per se, rather an overview of the state of information security, and why it is in such a state.
In chapter 16, The Cult of Schneier [full disclosure -- Bruce Schneier and I work for the same company], Viega takes Schneier to task for the fact that many people are using his book Applied Cryptography, even though it has not been updated in over a decade. It is not fair to blame him for that. While Viega admits that he holds Schneier in high esteem, the chapter reads like the author is somehow jealous of Schneier's security rock star status.
Chapter 18 is on the topic of security snake oil, ironically a topic Schneier has long been at the forefront of. The chapter gives the reader sage advice that it is important to do their homework on security products you buy and to make sure you have at least a high-level understanding of the technical merits and drawbacks of the security product at hand. The problem though is that the vast majority of end-users clearly don't have the technical wherewithal to do that. It is precisely that scenario that gives rise to far too many security snake-oil vendors.
Perhaps the best chapter in the book, and the one to likely get the most comments, is chapter 24 -- Open Source Security: A Red Herring. Viega takes on Eric Raymond's theory of open source security that "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." Viega notes that a large challenge with security and open source is that a lot of the things that make for secure systems are not well defined. Viega closes with the argument that one can argue open versus closed source forever, but there isn't strong evidence to suggest that it is the right question to be asking in the first place.
Overall, The Myths of Security: What the Computer Security Industry Doesn't Want You to Know is good introduction to information security. While well-written and though provoking, the book may be too conceptual and unstructured for an average end-user, and too basic for many experienced information security professionals. But for those that are interested, the book covers the entire gamut of the information security, and the reader, either security pro or novice, comes out much better informed.
While the author makes it clear he works for McAfee, and at times takes the company to task; the book references McAfee far too many times. At times the book seems like it is an advertisement for the company.
Viega does give interesting and often entertaining overviews of what we often take for granted. Some of the books arguments are debatable, but many more are a refreshing look at the dynamic information security industry. Viega has sat down and written his observations of what it going on. They are worth perusing, and the book is definitely worth reading.
8 of 11 found the following review helpful:
 A Rude Awakening for Many (Who Will Probably Try and Hide or Dismiss the Facts)Jul 09, 2009
By Mark Curphey
I was lucky enough to be sent a pre-production copy of the book by John. As I read the TOC my jaw dropped. Finally someone has the balls to say whats really happening. Far too many people have been hiding behind marketing FUD or driving their opinions and defending their actions laregly to defend their careers and salaries. I am sure it's a tough message to swallow for many. I saw many things I am or have been guilty of in the book. That's all the more reason why it needed to be said. The industry needs to be cleaned up and the BS called out for what it is.
I applaude John for having the balls to write it.
Its not just a must read, its a must take note and must take action book!
6 of 9 found the following review helpful:
Wonderfully contrarian writing on our views of computer securityAug 19, 2009
By James Holmes
"Co-Author 'Windows Developer Power Tools'"
This is a wonderfully contrarian view to much of the information we are fed regarding security. Viega brings a much-needed skeptical view to many of the things we as consumers and workers in the IT industry are fed. He skewers everything from antivirus to identity theft and takes a lot of effort to lay out his propositions around how bad guys are driven by money.
I got a bit weary of the not-quite-shilling for McAffee, the company Viega works for, and there were a couple technical howlers (a server-side application which required 200 servers simply "because it was written in Java"). Those irritants aside, it really is a great read which, whether you agree with his points or not, should make you re-evaluate how you look at security.
Books which make you think are always a Good Thing.
Ask Felgall - Book ReviewDec 14, 2011
By Stephen Chapman
In some ways this is a very scary book in that it very clearly explains how impossible that it is to actually secure a computer or network and clearly shows how some options give a false sense of security and may even make your system less secure. On the other hand, the book does make it clear what parts of security software do work and how well they work (where having security software works better than not having it). For the most part I agree fully with what the author says about security software worth having and what isn't worth it both for those who know nothing about security and for those more knowledgeable. With those areas where I did not have sufficient prior knowledge to have formed an opinion the viewpoint in the book appears logical.
The closest that I come to actually disagreeing with the author is with regard to personal firewalls. He points out that unless the firewall itself is preconfigured to know what software should and shouldn't have access that the computer user is presented with a whole lot of popups from all the components of the software that they have installed that ask for access. Obviously only someone really knowledgeable on what components belong to what software with a high level of security knowledge as well can reasonably answer all those questions and the typical user will either answer no inappropriately and block their software from running or will answer yes to everything and so defeat the purpose in having the software running in the first place. I agree fully with the author up to that point and yet I still run a personal firewall on all the computers I have at home. The reason that I do this is not really security related (although having a firewall alert pop up at a time when I am not starting a new program is still a good clue to it being something that should be blocked).Basically I run a firewall to control what programs have access to the web. For example I have a copy of Google Chrome installed on my computer that I use for occasional testing of JavaScript that I write. Since I only perform these tests occasionally there is no need for the program to be allowed to check for updates every day and I therefore have it blocked from performing that function in the personal firewall.
Perhaps the biggest problem that this book has is identifying just who its target audience is. For the most part (as acknowledged in the book) the typical computer user has no interest in security and therefore is unlikely to even look at the book. Many of those actually working in security probably think that they already know all the answers and so would also not read this book (even though they are the ones who would probably benefit the most from reading it).
The second biggest problem with this book is that it presents you with all the reasons why various parts of computer security don't work but doesn't (and can't) provide the solutions to those problems. While someone who has read the book will have a much greater understanding of how their computer security isn't protecting them as well as it should, they are still stuck with nothing better to put in its place.
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